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Abstract: This article considers ways that torts decisions and doctrine may
operate discriminatorily against the unhealthy. The discussion draws from
one chapter of my recently published book, Healthism: Health Status
Discrimination and the Law, specifically, the chapter on “Healthism in
Private Law.” Healthism examines, across contexts, instances of discrimination based on health status, suggesting that in at least some circumstances,
treating people differently because of their health status or health habits is
normatively wrong and, thus, “healthist.” We discuss many examples in the
book, but our ultimate goal is to introduce the term into the public lexicon
and attune readers to additional examples, which, we maintain, abound:
Consider non-smoking policies in public housing; airlines or movie theaters
charging obese passengers for two seats; employers refusing to hire based on
out-of-work health habits and conditions, including tobacco use and obesity;
or a physician refusing to treat a patient with multiple conditions and a
history of noncompliance. Each of these scenarios carries a potential for
healthism.
Keywords: health law, healthism, torts, insurance, illness, medical condition,
health status, discrimination, healthist, private conduct, statutory caps, medical
malpractice, reasonably prudent person, negligence, reasonable care, ageism,
obesity, unhealthy, contagious diseases, substance abuse

I Introduction
This article considers ways that torts decisions and doctrine may operate discriminatorily against the unhealthy. The discussion draws from one chapter of
my recently published book, Healthism: Health Status Discrimination and the
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Law, specifically, the chapter on “Healthism in Private Law.”1 Healthism examines, across contexts, instances of discrimination based on health status, suggesting that in at least some circumstances, treating people differently because
of their health status or health habits is normatively wrong and, thus, “healthist.”2 We discuss many examples in the book, but our ultimate goal is to
introduce the term into the public lexicon and attune readers to additional
examples, which, we maintain, abound: Consider non-smoking policies in public housing3; airlines or movie theaters charging obese passengers for two seats4;
employers refusing to hire based on out-of-work health habits and conditions,
including tobacco use and obesity5; or a physician refusing to treat a patient
with multiple conditions and a history of noncompliance.6
Since our book has been published, additional examples come to our attention almost daily. Workers with Type 1 diabetes may be reluctant to reveal their
conditions and rarely are provided private, sanitary insulin injection locations in
the workplace, even while the same may be provided to nursing mothers.7
Traditional Western medicine may be reluctant to recognize certain conditions,
including tick-born illness, irritable bowel syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome,
and gluten sensitivity as “real.” One online live doctor app asks the user to allow
access to data on her phone. After a brief introduction to key points about the
book and the concept of healthism, this article highlights tort law examples of
differential treatment based on health status, inviting discussion whether those
examples are “healthist” in the normative sense. Our book provides a deeper
theoretical framework and decisional rubric for making that determination, but
we introduce it here in broad terms to inform readers’ thinking about the question.
Our purpose in the private law chapter, as in preceding chapters on insurance law, discrimination law, and privacy law, is to survey the legal landscape,
1 See JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH-STATUS DISCRIMINATION
LAW 129–76 (2018).
2 Id. at ix (defining “healthism” as the undesirable differentiations on the basis of health).
3 Id. at 77–78 (using this example); see also Dave Fagundes & Jessica L. Roberts, Housing,
Healthism, and the HUD Smoke-Free Policy, NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY (2018), https://scholarly
commons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr_online/268.
4 Id. at 21 (arguing that such a policy is healthist).
5 Id. at 37 (noting that these hiring policies offend health equality); Jessica L. Roberts,
Healthism and the Law of Employment Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 571 (2014).
6 Virginia L. Hood, Can a Physician Refuse to Help a Patient? American Perspective, POLSKIE
ARCHIWUM MEDYCYNY WEWNETRZNEJ (2008), http://pamw.pl/sites/default/files/pamw_06_
hood_pogl_en.pdf.
7 AM. DIABETES ASS’N, Your Rights on the Job, http://www.diabetes.org/living-with-diabetes/
know-your-rights/discrimination/employment-discrimination/your-rights-on-the-job.html (last
edited Feb. 28, 2017) (noting the prevalence of discrimination against diabetic employees).
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identifying underexamined instances of health status discrimination and gaps in
existing legal protections for healthism. A variety of federal statutes address
particular types of discrimination but fail to fully address the problem of
differential treatment of the unhealthy. The Americans with Disability Act
(ADA), for example, prohibits discrimination in certain contexts (e. g. the workplace and places of public accommodation) but fails to protect conditions or
statuses falling outside of the statutory definition, or differential treatment in
other settings.8 The Genetic Information and Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)
initially protected against discrimination in employment only.9 The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) largely prohibits health-status underwriting and ratemaking in health insurance but continues to allow and even
encourage disadvantaging treatment of smokers, the elderly, and those who opt
out of workplace wellness programs.10 Although the ACA extends a number of
existing federal antidiscrimination laws to health insurance, conditions and
statuses outside of those laws remain unprotected.11 Also, existing workplace
and other privacy laws do not fully protect individuals’ from access to and use of
their health information for discriminatory treatment.12
Although perhaps less apparent, healthism also is prevalent in private law.
Private law principally governs disputes and arrangements between private
parties, making systematic discrimination harder to identify and address
through prescriptive policy reforms. Consider the essential notion of freedom
of contract, which allows individuals to refuse to contract with, or to offer
discriminatory contract terms to, anyone, for any reason, including health
status.13 That common-law baseline may be altered by judge-made doctrines
or legislative overlay prohibiting certain agreements or refusals to contract on
public policy grounds. Tort law is primarily concerned with allocation of loss

8 See e. g. ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 59 (noting that the ADA’s protections based on
weight remain limited).
9 EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Facts About the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-gina.cfm.
10 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 18, 44 (describing the ACA’s use of risk profiles to
determine individual premiums, singling out certain groups, and the discriminatory effects of
surcharges).
11 Cite ACA § 1557 (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975).
12 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 3 (arguing that employers’ mining and use of private
health information invites discriminatory policies).
13 See 15–17 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 79–3 (2017) (noting that private parties write their own
binding agreements).
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and make-whole compensation between the injured party and injurer.14 The
project of tort law in not inherently discriminatory, but various rules may result
in differential treatment of the unhealthy.
This article is limited to the private law of torts, revealing various features
that allow or promote health-status discrimination. If drunk drivers routinely are
held liable for not only compensatory but also punitive damages, is that healthist? If a smoker’s damages for workplace exposure to asbestos are lower than a
nonsmoking coworker’s damages for the same exposure, is that discriminatory?
When an individual voluntarily engages in known health-risky behavior, such as
skydiving, mountain climbing, helmetless motorcycle riding, or overeating,
should tort law allow recovery for injuries sustained in the activity? Do medical
malpractice damages caps systematically discriminate against victims of medical error vis-à-vis victims of other types of conduct?
The question answered more fully in our book is whether these rules and
decisions are healthist, meaning that they systematically disadvantage litigants
based on the health status in a way that effects a normative wrong. The normative
wrong question is the lynchpin, and we offer a guide to making that assessment that
turns on four guiding principles – health welfarism, health liberty, health equality,
and health justice. In some cases, there may be sound public policy reasons for
such differential treatment. If so, the private law rules may not be considered
healthist under our rubric. On the other hand, at least some of these laws, decisions,
and policies result in a normative wrong when examined through the healthism
lens. The book and this article stop short of a full prescriptive recommendation for
healthism in tort law, much less the wider, heterogeneous range of examples
discussed in other chapters. Rather than proposing a set of legal reforms or model
laws, we endeavor to open a conversation, inviting closer examination of our own
and others’ behaviors and choices for instances of disadvantageous treatment
based on health status. Just as law, policymakers, and scholars have advocated
for consideration of “Health in All Policies,” in essence, we advocate awareness of
the potential for “healthism in all policies,” including, here, torts.

II Discussion
This Part provides a brief overview of our concept of healthism and the methodology for distinguishing benign, or even salutary, classifications based on health

14 See DAN B. DOBBS ET
Publishing 2016) (2000).

AL.,

HORNBOOK
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status from normatively wrong, or healthist, classifications. It then describes
previous torts scholarship on discrimination based on other statuses, such as
sex, age, and mental or emotional conditions. Finally, it identifies a host of tort
law decisions and doctrine treating litigants differently based on health status. I
reserve until the final part of the article discussion on the normative question.

A The concept of healthism
The idea for our book dates back to the debates leading up to and surrounding
President Barack Obama’s signature achievement, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the ACA, or Obamacare). The ACA includes two
critical private market reforms, namely it bans (1) preexisting condition exclusions and (2) risk-adjusted premium rates.15 In essence, individuals cannot be
denied health insurance or charged more for their health insurance because they
are unhealthy.16 To that extent, the law accurately was heralded as an antidiscrimination law for the unhealthy.17
Now, almost ten years out, those provisions – the end of health-status underwriting and ratemaking – are deeply imbedded and highly valued across partisan
lines. Amid repeal and replace debates, those basic protections for the unhealthy in
commercial health insurance are almost as much of a political third-rail as Medicare
reform. A recent Texas federal district court opinion striking down the individual
mandate and holding it non-severable from the rest of the Act is, hopefully, a oneoff decision that will be corrected on appeal.18 Even so, the decision was political
slight-of-hand. It came just after the 2018 midterm elections, allowing conservatives
to publicly challenge the disfavored law in court, in front of a hand-picked conservative judge, while avoiding voter backlash by throwing the existence of those
protections into doubt, as a pre-November court decision would have.19 That being
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-gg-1, -4.
16 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 112–13 (summarizing the ACA’s preexisting exclusion
conditions and prohibition on charging differential premiums based on health status).
17 Id. at ix (“The ACA aspires to end discrimination against the unhealthy, at least with respect
to access to end health insurance.”)
18 See, Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 605 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (holding that the
individual mandate violates the Commerce Clause).
19 See Vann R. Newkirk II, What Happens to Obamacare Now?, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 17, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/obamacare-remains-despite-judges-rul
ing-texas/578356/.; Amy Goldstein, Federal Judge in Texas Rules Entire Obama Health-Care Law
is Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/federal-judge-in-texas-rules-obama-health-care-law-unconstitutional/2018/12/
14/9e8bb5a2-fd63-11e8-862a-b6a6f3ce8199_story.html?utm_term=.a6034aac86bf.
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said, Congress’s repeal of the individual mandate tax penalty, effective January 1,
2019,20 also means that no one is compelled to purchase health insurance at all,
much less comprehensive coverage that includes antidiscrimination and various
other federal protections.21
It bears emphasis that acceptance of the view that individuals should not
face discrimination in health insurance represents a major shift in public opinion and an exception to classical notions of insurance. To be sure, it is perfectly
rational for an insurer to avoid covering people who have already experienced a
loss and perfectly rational to charge higher premiums to based on individual risk
profiles. We expect that for our auto or homeowners’ insurance. Without federal
backing, insurers – for good reason – would be disinclined to sell flood insurance in disaster-prone locales.22 But the ACA recognizes health insurance as not
simply a way to purchase financial protection against unexpected risk of catastrophic illness but, rather, a means of extending access to essential medical
care to considerably more people and supporting a healthier population
overall.23
The book’s central thesis is this: Health-status discrimination is normatively
wrong – and, thus, “healthist” – when the law, policy, or practice decreases
access to health care, exacerbates existing disparities, intrudes on private conduct, decreases individual or community health, or operates from animus or
unfair stereotypes.24 That’s a mouthful, admittedly. But the fluidity of the
definition, with several moving parts, is both accurate and necessary given the
landscape. An analogy that we make in the book is that our definition is similar
to the reasonable care standard for negligence – a variable, flexible standard
that balances competing public policies, including priorities that may shift with
time, place, and new information.25 Thus, torts scholars may be especially
receptive to and undaunted by our approach.
20 Tax Cut & Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
21 Rabah Kamal et al., How Repeal of the Individual Mandate and Expansion of Loosely
Regulated Plans are Affecting 2019 Premiums, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, (Oct. 26,
2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/how-repeal-of-the-individual-mandate-andexpansion-of-loosely-regulated-plans-are-affecting-2019-premiums/.
22 See, e. g. National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), DISASTERASSISTANCE.gov, https://www.
disasterassistance.gov/get-assistance/forms-of-assistance/4465 (last viewed Jan. 26, 2019)
(offering federally-backed disaster insurance).
23 See e. g. ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 111–12 (noting that the ACA provided coverage
options for those who had historically lacked coverage).
24 Id. at 22–23, (“[P]olicies that are based on animus or unfair stereotypes, unduly infringe on
private conduct, fail to improve health or promote healthier choices, reduce access to health
care, or deepen disparities are normatively wrong and, therefore, healthist.”).
25 Id. at 22 (noting that policies that are healthist today may not be healthist in the future).
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Defining healthism is one challenge of the project. Another is the fact that
with other “isms” – race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, gender,
pregnancy, disability, genetic information, religion, military service, immigration status, age, to name several existing protected categories – there are few, if
any, instances in which treating an individual differently on those bases is
acceptable.26 By contrast, we acknowledge that differential treatment based on
health status in many cases, can be a good thing for both the individual and
society. Is it healthist for my university’s health plan to offer discounts on health
insurance premiums if I certify my status as a non-tobacco user? When NYC
Mayor Bloomberg banned sugary drinks above a specified portion size, was that
law healthist? If a reproductive endocrinologist offers a couple prenatal testing
for potential chromosomal abnormalities, is that healthist? What we offer
instead of a hard-and-fast definition, on-off switch, or model anti-healthism
statute, is a rubric for navigating the divide between health-promoting and
healthist classifications.
Like good first-year professors, our approach is to provide a methodology
and to invite readers to apply it to novel fact-patterns. Thus, the book concludes
with a roadmap for distinguishing the “good,” or health-promoting examples,
from the “bad,” or healthist, laws, policies, and practices. The various real-world
examples are like tort law cases and hypos used to “teach” readers how to
conduct the analysis. We offer multi-factor decisional rubric in Chapter Six,
drawing on four guiding principles unpacked in Chapter Two.27 Chapter Two’s
four principles include (1) health welfare, (2) health liberty, (3) health equality,
and (4) health justice.28 These principles operate in tandem, and sometimes in
tension; no single one trumps the others. And readers may differ on how to
apply or weight the factors. Nevertheless, that debate still serves our larger goal
of drawing attention to the issue and starting a dialogue.
To briefly describe the guiding priciples: Health welfare derives from utilitarian philosophy. The central insight is that facilitating individual decisionmaking promotes societal welfare.29 Generally speaking, actions or choices that
make life better by increasing the amount of good things (such as pleasure
26 Id. at 177 (arguing that recognized categories of discrimination are usually normatively
wrong); However, the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification is one exception where discrimination is acceptable. See id. (showing how certain qualifications, in context of BFOQ, are not
normatively wrong).
27 Id. at 181, table 6.1 (offering a “healthism rubric”).
28 Id. at 23–53 (introducing and discussing the guiding principles of health welfare, liberty,
equality, and justice as a means for identifying healthism).
29 Id. at 179 (claiming that health welfare seeks to create the greatest good for the greatest
number of people).
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and happiness) in the world, or decreasing the amount of bad things (such as
pain and unhappiness), are morally right. In our context, then a law, policy, or
practice that produces worse health outcomes for individuals or society at large,
or impedes access to health care, would be inconsistent with health welfare.
Likewise, a policy that restricts individuals’ ability to make autonomous choices
would tend to be healthist. Accordingly, our approach to health welfare allows
for positive paternalism, recognizing that information, nudges, and other inducements may promote individual and community health even though, at first
blush, they may seem to intrude on individual decisionmaking.30
Relatedly, health liberty derives from John Stuart Mills’s harm principle,
limiting government intervention that infrings on individual liberty to instances
when necessary to prevent harm to others.31 An individual should not have to
refrain from acting in the way she chooses as long her actions do not intrude on
others’ freedom of action. The U.S. Constitition enshrines this negative rights
view of liberty; it protects us from government intrusion on our liberty but does
not contain affirmative guarantees of government services or protections.32
Given that “right to be left alone,” privacy and autonomy necessarily are
components of liberty.33 Thus, health-status classifications that punish people
for private conduct, such as refusing to hire based on out-of-work conduct, or
that intrude too deeply on medical or other privacy raise the specter of healthism. If an employer receives notice from its health plan administrator that an
employee has discontinued birth control pills or been diagnosed with a new
health condition, there is the potential for healthism.34 By the same token, if a
college issues free Fitbits to incoming freshmen to track their exercise and sleep
habits,35 health privacy and, thereby, autonomy, is threatened.
Health equality encompasses the norms of equitable treatment and dignity.
Within the equal protection literature, there is something of a divide between
anti-classification, or formal equality, and anti-subordination, or substantive

30 Id. (allowing for paternalism in contexts that improve collect health, lower health risks, and
decrease health-care costs).
31 Id. at 32 (citing JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM 12 (Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 1992) (1859)).
32 Id. at 32.
33 Id. at 33 (citing Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890)).
34 Tami Luhby, What Does Your Employer Know About Your Health?, CNN BUSINESS (Feb. 12,
2014), https://money.cnn.com/2014/02/12/news/economy/employer-health/index.html.
35 Todd C. Frankel, Fitbits Now Mandatory for Students at this Oklahoma University, WASH.
POST (Feb. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/02/02/fitbitsnow-mandatory-for-students-at-this-oklahoma-university/?utm_term=.cede0fc67c7e.
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equality, schools of thought.36 Because we recognize various examples of
health-status differentiation as non-healthist, our concept sounds more clearly
in the anti-subordination register. That is to say, merely putting the healthy in
one pile, and the unhealthy in another, in and of itself, is not healthist. By the
same token, facially neutral laws may have a disparate impact on the unhealthy
or operate from impermissible premises. Laws, policies, and practices motivated
by or perpetuating stigma and unfair stereotypes would offend health equality.37
Many policies around obesity fit within this description, including the aforementioned Big Gulp ban.38 Although facially neutral, the policy communicated the
message that poor health and obesity, in particular, is the result of individual
failing and lack of will-power as opposed to various structural and social
determinants of health that also contribute.39 In that regard, the law, although
facially neutral by applying to everyone in New York City, operated discriminatorily by preying on existing stigma and stereotypes against obese individuals.
Finally, health justice encompasses the three foregoing values – welfare,
liberty, and equality – but focuses on biases underlying institutional design
choices that have the effect of perpetuating existing disparities.40 Equality
alone – everyone having the same sized slice of the pie – does not get at the
problem if some people lack access to the table or utensils for eating the pie. For
example, an employer might seek to incentivize healthier habits by offering
health club memberships or financial incentives for achieving certain biometric
markers (e. g. body-mass index or blood pressure). Like the Big Gulp ban, that
workplace wellness program is facially neutral, offered to all employees. But if
the effect of the policy is to cut off resources or otherwise limit the ability of a
cohort of employees to adopt healthy life choices, or if the opportunity is not
available to some workers because of existing disparities (e. g. challenges with
transportation, childcare, eldercare, multiple jobs) the policy may tend to be
36 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 10–11 (discussing the different frameworks for
understanding discrimination).
37 Id. at 37 (arguing that singling persons out based on health status, societal aversions to the
“unhealthy,” or because of lowered social value due to health status goes against health
equality).
38 The Big Gulp ban refers to a short-lived New York City law which capped the sale of certain
sugary beverages to sixteen-ounce servings. Haley Draznin, NYC Loses Appeal to Ban Large
Sugary Drinks, CNN (June 26, 2014), www.cnn.com/2014/06/26/justice/ny-sugary-drink-rulling/
index.html.
39 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 43 (discussing one objection to such legislature is
that it punishes those who lack willpower and inappropriately is based on disparaging
stereotypes).
40 See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
47 (2014).
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healthist. Health justice calls for reforms to correct maldistribution of societal
resources, thus allowing individuals to more fully enjoy the other attributes of
welfare, liberty, and equality.41
In Chapter 6, we apply the four guiding principles above to create a decisional rubric, as follows:
Table 1: Healthism Rubrica.
Characteristics of Socially Desirable
Health-Status Differentiation

Characteristics of Healthism

Promotes healthy decisionmaking*
Facilitates individual choices regarding
health#
Lowers health risks*
Lowers health-care costs*
Facilitates better health care and better
health-care access°

Is driven by animus†
Stigmatizes individuals unfairly†
Punishes people for their private conduct#
Impedes access to health care°
Cuts off resources or otherwise limits the ability to
adopt healthy life choices#
Produces worse health outcomes°
Maintains or increases existing health disparities†

a
See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 181.
*Health welfare #Health liberty †Health equality °Health justice.

The Chapter then unpacks three sets of examples: (1) clearly healthist laws,
policies, or practices; (2) clearly health-promoting laws, policies, or practices;
and (3) cases for which a clear answer is not available due to the need for
additional empirical research on the health effects of a certain policy or other
uncertainty in weighing competing values.42 In some instances, we advocate legal
responses to healthist practices and policies, identifying gaps in existing protections for the unhealthy and proposing appropriate reforms.43 In other instances,
we endorse health status distinctions that promote healthier behaviors and conduct, with a cautionary eye toward the potential for those laws to perpetuate
discrimination and stigmatization of disfavored groups.44 Finally, we leave some

41 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 45 (arguing that health justice addresses distributive
concerns at a systematic, society-wide level).
42 Id. at 177–208 (discussing the application of the model of health-based classifications).
43 Id. at 192 (noting that instances like Florida’s capping of the price paid by insurance
companies for HIV/AIDS medications required a legal response).
44 Id. at 178 (acknowledging that some health-based distinctions encourage persons to adopt
healthier habits).
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examples for further discussion, research, and policy development whether and
how to address the particular instance of health-status differentiation.45

B Health status discrimination in tort law
Turning now to healthism in tort law, this Part describes a number of rules and
decisions that systematically treat unhealthy litigants differently than healthy
ones. The existence of discrimination in private, largely judge-made, law may be
less obvious than in public law. Therefore, before urging recognition of a novel
form of discrimination based on health status, the article first notes ways that
tort law disadvantages other, more established, protected categories, drawing on
existing scholarship.

1 Other “isms” in tort law
Other scholars have identified normatively wrong discrimination in torts on the
basis of gender, race, ethnicity, age, family status, and other categories. In many
cases, either by common law or statutory reform, the law has evolved to correct
those historical instances of unequal treatment.46 In other cases, additional
reform still may be warranted.47 We anticipate much less recognition of tort
law’s potential for healthism and, accordingly, even greater need for attention to
the issue.
a Discrimination in the common law
There are multiple ways in which tort law has, and continues to, discriminate
against women. Historically, women did not have any legal identity separate
from their husbands and, thus, could not be sued or sue on their own behalf.
On the same basis, any damages recovered by a woman inured to her

45 Id. at 202 (noting that sometimes the analysis of some policies turns on empirical evidence
that is only available after implementing the policy and seeing if its effects are socially
desirable).
46 Id. at 131 (offering the example of how the law evolved after the Married Women’s Acts of
the Nineteenth Century to allow women to recover for personal injuries).
47 Id. (citing Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
463 (1998) (hereinafter Chamallas, Deep Structures); Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary
Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435 (2005)
(hereinafter Chamallas, Civil Rights)).
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husband.48 Even when women achieved legal standing through Married
Women’s Acts of the Nineteenth Century, the claims for which they could
recover were limited to property damage.49 It took further evolution of the
law to allow women to recover for personal injuries.50 Also, historically,
women could not recover for loss of consortium based on injury to their
husbands, even though husbands could recover for injury to their wives.51
Modern tort law has all but eliminated those formal distinctions, demonstrating “the power of changed social attitudes to influence the law.”52
Historical vestiges aside, modern examples of gender discrimination still operate
in tort law. For example, damages rules systematically undercompensate women by
incorporating historical wage differentials into the calculation.53 Even though
women have longer life and work-life expectancies, they consistently receive lower
awards for lost future earnings. Additionally, tort injuries to women more typically
are categorized as emotional or relational, which harms are systemically undercompensated as compared to personal injury or property damage, the types of
damages that men are more likely to be awarded.54 Based on those findings,
Martha Chamallas concludes that, although tort rules appear facially neutral, we
need to examine the “deep structures” in tort law to recognize the resulting inequality.55 Her goal is not to suggest specific tort reforms but rather “to develop the habit of
routinely assessing the differential effects of tort rules.”56 To the extent that healthism exists in tort law, we would similarly urge awareness of the issue.57

48 Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course, 1 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 4, 45–46 (1989) (hereinafter Finley, YALE); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M.
SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, (Aspen Publishers, 10th ed. 2012).
49 Finley, YALE, supra note 49, at 46.
50 Id. at 47.
51 Id. at 49; see also EPSTEIN & SHARKEY, supra note 49; see also, Phong T. Dinh, Equal
Protection Clause Mandates Judicial Expansion of Necessaries Doctrine to Impose Mutual
Burden Upon Spouses-Landmark Medical Center v. Gauthier, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 573 (1995)
(accepting equal protection challenge to Rhode Island’s necessaries doctrine imposing equal
burden on wives to pay the necessary expenses of their husbands).
52 Finley, YALE, supra note 49, at 47.
53 See Chamallas, Deep Structures, supra note 48, at 530.
54 Id.; see also Chamallas, Civil Rights, supra note 48, at 1441; see also Finley, YALE, supra note
49, at 65.
55 See Chamallas, Deep Structures, supra note 48, at 530.
56 Id. at 531.
57 See, similarly, WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 219–38
(2009) (examining various tort law examples through her population-based approach to legal
analysis).
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Racism also infects tort law. Chamallas’s empirical work on damages also
has implications for race, revealing race-linked devaluation of black lives, black
earning potential, and other harms.58 Estimates of lost future earnings for racial
minorities may be depressed by historical wage differentials and lower work-life
expectancy based on higher rates of unemployment and incarceration.59 Frank
McClellan critically examined insidious operation of racial bias across the torts
system, including risk assessment, jury selection, burdens of persuasion,
damages calculations, and settlement negotiations.60 He suggests that “the
race problem impacts on every aspect of a tort claim”61 and urges that true
tort reform should take into account race, gender, and class issues.62
Race and gender discrimination also evidences in the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED). IIED requires the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in outrageous or extreme conduct
that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.63 Scholars assert
that IIED, sometimes dubbed the “outrage tort,” fails adequately to capture both
gender- and race-based animus and verbal abuse.64 That is because the tort
turns on the factfinder’s assessment of whether the comment or conduct was
sufficiently outrageous or extreme. All too often, juries (and even judges, who
not infrequently decide IIED cases as a matter of law) are not attuned to the
particular insults, offenses, or vulnerabilities that women and minorities experience.65 Thus, they might conclude that the defendant’s conduct was offensive
but not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to constitute a tort.66 Verbal and
emotional harassment claims often arise in the employment context. Certain
workplace equal protection laws, namely Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

58 See Chamallas, Deep Structures, supra note 48, at 471–74.
59 Id. at 481.
60 Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial Justice, 48 RUTGERS
L. REV. 761, 771 (1996).
61 Id. at 772
62 Id. at 791.
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §46 (1965).
64 Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration From Civil Rights to Tort Law,
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115 (2007); See also McClellan, supra note 61, at 771 (arguing similarly
re “outrageousness” and punitive damages in products liability).
65 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 132 (discussing outrageousness as it relates to
women and minorities).
66 See, e. g. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding
plaintiff’s racial harassment allegations that her supervisor stared at her for several minutes at a
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1964,67 and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Reform Act of 1991,68 now provide a
sometimes clearer remedy for workplace racial and sexual harassment.
b Discrimination in tort reform statutes
Tort reform has injected new forms of discriminatory treatment of various
protected groups. Over the past few decades, beginning in 1975, a number of
states enacted statutory caps on noneconomic damages, often, specifically, in
the medical malpractice context.69 Other statutes limited recovery in wrongful
death cases and punitive damage awards. Business interests, especially the
medical and liability insurance fields, supported tort reform statutes, urging
that runaway jury awards for intangible harms, including pain and suffering
and wrongful death, were a major driver of escalating medical malpractice
premiums, health care costs, and health care provider shortages.70 Over time,
caps have been challenged and, in many cases, overturned on various constitutional grounds 71
Meanwhile, where statutory caps have been in place, scholars and litigants have persuasively argued that they discriminate against women, the
elderly, the disabled, and the young. As we discuss further below, the caps
also may discriminate based on health status. First, caps disadvantage
women72 because noneconomic damages typically represent a significantly

time, assigned her too many tasks, made her sweep and dust (jobs not assigned to white
workers) fell “far short” of North Carolina law).
67 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
68 Pub. L. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071.
69 Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 397 (2005) (detailing the introduction of medical malpractice caps as a
response to the medical malpractice insurance crisis of the early 1970s).
70 Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and
Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 926 (2008) (noting that locations with high medical
malpractice premiums tend to have fewer physicians per capita).
71 See Katheryn L. Vezina, Constitutional Challenges to Caps on Tort Damages: Is Tort Reform
the Dragon Slayer or is it the Dragon, Public Access and the New England Shoreline, 42 ME. L REV.
219, 228–33 (listing the ways in which caps on tort damages have been constitutionally
challenged and overturned); see also David L. Hudson Jr., More States See Tort Limits
Challenged as Unconstitutional, NATIONAL PULSE (Oct. 9, 2014, 8:18 PM), http://www.abajour
nal.com/magazine/article/more_states_see_tort_limits_challenged_as_unconstitutional/;
Noneconomic Damages Reform, ATRA http://www.atra.org/issues/noneconomic-damagesreform (last viewed Jan. 27, 2019).
72 See Rebecca Korzec, Maryland Tort Damages: A Form of Sex-Based Discrimination, 37 U.
BALT. L. F. 97 (2007); See also, Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women,
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greater portion of women’s total damages award than men’s,73 as discussed
above. Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad studied products liability and
medical malpractice cases, in particular, revealing that caps on noneconomic
damages and restrictions on punitive damages in those cases disproportionately impact women.74
Statutory caps on noneconomic damages also arguably discriminate against
the elderly, young, poor, and minorities.75 Like women, those groups also
typically suffer lower economic loss compared to their wealthy white male
counterparts because of their relatively lower earning capacity and/or lack of
work.76 As evidence of age discrimination, Lucinda Finley examined nursing
home abuse cases in Florida and demonstrated that damages in those cases
include a much higher proportion of noneconomic damages than general tort
awards; therefore, she concluded that the elderly are disproportionately
impacted by caps.77 Moreover, caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases especially impact children, who suffer a disproportionate share of
those injuries and experience them over a longer period of time, yet may not
have demonstrable lost income. Damages awarded to a similarly injured person
older person, with fewer years left to live, will not be reduced as dramatically.78

Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263 (2004) (using empirical data) (hereinafter Finley,
EMORY).
73 See Finley, EMORY, supra note 73, at 1266 (observing that the impact of certain womenspecific injuries, including “sexual or reproductive harm, pregnancy loss, and sexual assault
injuries” are primarily emotional suffering and self-esteem, rather than economic wage earning
capacity or monetary expenses); Korzec, supra note 73, at 100 (re SAHMs and soccer moms,
noting undervaluation for caretakers’ loss when child dies or is disabled).
74 Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70
WASH. L. REV. 1, 45–47 (1995) (Regarding proposed limitations, including proposed FDA
defense to punitive damages).
75 See Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1119 (2012) (summarizing appellant’s and amici AARP’s
arguments regarding discrimination against women and the elderly, which the court rejected on
finding no discriminatory motivation against those groups); see also Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med.
Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 782 (Mo. 2010) (Teitelman, J., concurring) (noting that the “impacts of the
caps will fall disproportionately on the young and economically disadvantaged. Young people,
because they will have to live with their injuries and disabilities the longest, bear the brunt of
section 538.210. Similarly, those with generally more limited economic prospects—the povertystricken, the physically and mentally disabled, single mothers, wounded veterans, the elderly,
and others—are impacted disproportionately by the arbitrary limits on non-economic
damages.”); see also Finley, EMORY, supra note 73, at 1265–66 (also noting discriminatory
impact of caps on the elderly, poor, and children).
76 See Finley, EMORY, supra note 73, at 1280–81.
77 Id. at 1305–06.
78 See Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 462, 466 (Wis. 2005).
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Caps also systematically undercompensate for death of infants and children, the
damages for which are largely noneconomic.79
Moreover, if the statutory cap applies to all victims of medical malpractice,
no matter the number of plaintiffs or victims, the cap further discriminates based
on family and parenthood status. That is because any claims for loss of consortium available to the spouse or children of the primary victim would fall
within the aggregate cap. Consequently, an unmarried, childless medical malpractice victim might receive full compensation while a married victim with
three children injured in the same manner could result in under-compensation
to the family group. At least a few courts have accepted those theories to strike
down caps on equal protection grounds, applying low-level rational basis
scrutiny.80
Litigants also have successfully argued that statutory caps systematically
discriminate against the most severely injured medical malpractice victims.81
Severely injured victims, with noneconomic damages valued above the statutory
cap (e. g. $250,000) are systematically undercompensated vis-à-vis less severely
injured victims who suffer noneconomic damages below the cap and, therefore,
are fully compensated.82 More generally, tort reform discriminates against victims of medical error as a class, compared to victims injured in other settings.
Frequently, caps on noneconomic damages and wrongful death recovery apply
specifically to medical malpractice cases, meaning that the recovery for a stayat-home mother killed by a drunk driver would not be capped, but death to the
same victim, resulting from medical error, would be.
This brief discussion of other “isms” in tort law demonstrates that scholars,
judges, and other lawmakers have recognized various examples of discrimination
79 Finley, EMORY, supra note 73, at 1294–95 (comparing cases involving non-fatal injury to
infants and children, which may involve extensive pecuniary loss due to lifetime medical,
therapeutic, and special educational services for disabilities).
80 See Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 at 466 (Wis. 2005)
(“because an injured patient shares the cap with family members, the cap has a disparate effect
on patients with families”); Vezina, supra note 72, at 228–33 (discussing how and when courts
have overturned caps on constitutional grounds).
81 See Ferdon, supra note 81, at 462 (concluding that “the cap divides the universe of injured
medical malpractice victims into a class of severely injured victims and less severely injured
victims.”); Miller v. Johnson, 289 P.3d 1098, 1119 (Kan. 2012) (It’s “obviously true” that “the
statutory cap treats personal injury plaintiffs differently based on whether their noneconomic
damages are higher or lower than $250,000.”); Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, 311 S.W.3d
752, 782 (Mo. 2010) (Teitelman, J., concurring) (“The caps operate on a perverse irony—those
with relatively minor injuries are permitted full recovery, while the most severely injured among
us are denied.”).
82 Id.
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in private law and, at least, in some cases, have addressed the problem. The
damages caps discussion also flags some potential subcategories of health-status
discrimination – medical error victims and the most severely injured plaintiffs.
Accepting that tort law may discriminate against recognized protected categories,
we turn now to a more methodical survey of tort law’s potential for health status
discrimination.

2 Health status in tort law
This Part examines various examples of differential treatment based on health
status in torts decisions and doctrine. First, as an overarching matter, tort law
favors those well enough to take action over those who remain passive victims.
Next, the discussion considers health status discrimination in the generally
applicable reasonably prudent person standard, in particular the standard’s
failure to recognize exceptions for mental health, age, and obesity. I then turn
to the role of health status on both sides of the courtroom: In some cases,
unhealthy defendants may be held liable when their health conditions are the
mechanism of injury. In other cases, plaintiffs who are unhealthy or engage in
health-risky conduct may be disadvantaged.
a Active versus passive distinction
In a broad sense, tort law distinguishes between those healthy enough to engage
in activities versus those who remain passive. Under the negligence principle
one who acts will be liable only if he fails to exercise reasonable care.83 His
freedom of action is protected so long as his conduct does not fall below that
standard of care. As a corollary of that principle, one who remains passive but
nonetheless is injured, will recover only some of the time, namely, when the
defendant who caused the injury acted unreasonably. Otherwise, the victim
generally cannot recover,84 although it may be clear that but for the other’s
action, he would not have been injured.

83 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §32, at 172 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed., 1984)
(stating that reasonable care has been tort law’s touchstone for over a century, invoking the
conduct of a person “of ordinary prudence” and exhorting tortfeasors “to do what such an ideal
individual would be supposed to do in his place”).
84 One exception is if a defendant non-negligently creates a risk for the plaintiff, he may have
a duty to take steps to protect against or warn of the risk. See, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODS. LIABL § CMT. I (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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Tort law could avoid discrimination against passive victims through a
strict liability standard. That approach would hold the one who acts and
causes injury liable regardless of the level of care that she exercised. As a
result, the passive victim could recover any time another’s conduct causes
him harm. That approach would tend to disfavor those who act, while
favoring those who remain passive. United States tort law, however, largely
rejects strict liability in favor of negligence as the prevailing standard of
care for accidental injuries.85 Negligence, or reasonable care, affords a
margin of error and freedom of action for those healthy enough to act, at
the expense of those who remain passive, including those whose health
statuses prevent them from engaging in affirmative conduct or action.86 In
this sense, the law of unintentional torts systematically disadvantages
unhealthy individuals.
Another way that tort law favors able-bodied individuals is through the
no-duty rule. Tort law imposes liability when someone acts carelessly, but
generally does not require a person to take action by helping, aiding, protecting, warning, or rescuing others, including those who are passive, infirm,
or helpless.87 A fellow pedestrian who sees a blind person (a stranger, to
whom he has no relation) about to step into the path of an oncoming truck
has no tort duty to try to prevent the accident. Likewise, if a pedestrian
comes across an unconscious person on the sidewalk in the middle of winter,
he is free to simply ignore the person’s peril and will not be liable unless he
affirmatively (and intentionally or unreasonably) injures the person, for
example, by kicking him or removing any blankets already in place.
Although morally it may be right for a physician on an airplane to try to
revive another passenger who loses consciousness, tort law generally does
not compel such action. The predominant no-duty rule privileges doctors’ and
other actors’ freedom of action, allowing them to go about their own business, free of any obligation to use their capabilities to help another.88
Accordingly, the no-duty rule also favors the healthy over the unhealthy.
Healthy would-be rescuers avoid liability as long as they do not cause
affirmative harm, while passive victims are denied assistance and tort
recovery.

85
86
87
88

See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 136.
Id.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIABL §

CMT.

I (AM. LAW INST. 1998).

Healthism in Tort Law

99

b Reasonably prudent person-ism
Tort law, and particularly the dominant theory of negligence, centers around
the hypothetical “Average Joe,” the reasonably prudent person. Roughly
speaking, a negligence case requires proof that the defendant (1) owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) breached the applicable standard of care,
and (3) that the breach caused (4) harm to the plaintiff.89 The prevailing
standard is reasonable care, also called ordinary care or the reasonably prudent person standard. However phrased, the standard is objective, meaning
that an individual’s subjective perspective, experience, predilections, or limitations generally are not considered.90 The issue is not what this particular
person could have or would have done, but what an “ordinary” or “reasonable” person could have or would have done. In other words, non-negligent
conduct is defined by reference to an objectively reasonable person.
Accordingly, tort law inherently discriminates against anyone who possesses
characteristics that are out of the ordinary. Poor health, among other traits,
can readily be considered out of the ordinary.
The ordinary care standard does not require flawless conduct or extraordinary measures but simply performance as an ordinary member of the community.
That approach has the effect of discriminating against women, racial and ethnic
minorities, the elderly, the young, and those with low mental capacity and other
impairments by holding them to the standard of a white male of average
intelligence and average age.91 The law has carved out limited exceptions for
persons with demonstrable physical disabilities and children. A blind person is
not expected to live up to the standard of care for someone with sight. She is,
however, expected to act prudently with respect to her disability or condition,
such as by wearing corrective lenses or retaining a human or animal guide.92
Likewise, children generally are not held to the adult standard of care but,
rather, the standard of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience, thus

89 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 14, at § 9.5.
90 Id. at § 10.5.
91 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §283B (“Unless the actor is a child, his insanity or
other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for conduct which does not
conform to the standard of a reasonable person under like circumstances.”); see also David E.
Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence Law: The Minor, The
Mentally Impaired, and The Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 17–18 (1981)
(noting that courts are not taken into account when comparing their conduct to the reasonable
person standard); see also Finley, YALE, supra note 49, at 57–65.
92 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 152 (stating that “breaks” are given to persons who
are physically disabled when evaluating their conduct against the conduct of an “average joe”).
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allowing some downward adjustment in the duty of care and some subjective
considerations.93 But other idiosyncrasies, including old age, low intelligence,
and inexperience, generally cannot be considered in adjusting the standard of
care.94
i Mental healthism
Despite the above-described accommodation for physical disabilities, tort law
does not afford the same adjusted standard of care for mental impairments.
Indeed, tort law persistently discriminates against a subcategory of health
status, namely mental health. Mentally ill, mentally disabled, or intellectually
impaired actors do not receive adjustments for their conditions but instead are
held to the objective standard of reasonable care. As discussed above, the law
allows that individuals with demonstrable physical impairments – blindness,
deafness, physical handicaps, and the like – may be unable to comply with the
reasonably prudent person standard. Holding them to that standard, then,
would amount to strict liability; they acted but did not choose the more dangerous course of action. Accordingly, those actors are required to act only as
reasonable persons with their same disabilities.
Mentally ill, intellectually impaired, and elderly individuals, by contrast, are
held to the objective standard, with no adjustment for their limitations. In the
negligence context, that standard has the effect of holding some people to a
standard of care that they may be incapable of achieving.95 For example, suppose
a person of below-average intelligence is hired to build a shed on the plaintiff’s
property, and the shed collapses due to shoddy construction, causing personal
injury and property damage. The defendant cannot avoid liability on the grounds
that he built the shed to the best of his own personal abilities, as long as a
reasonable person would and could have constructed it differently.96 This rule is
justified as protecting plaintiffs and avoiding line-drawing but does seem inherently unfair to the impaired actors who essentially are liable without fault.

93 Children, however, are held to the adult standard of care when they are engaged in adult
activities, such as driving. Difficult categorization issues arise with activities like skiing and
hunting, which might be considered adult or child activities, depending on the relevant
community and customs. Dorais v. Paquin, 304 A.2d 369, 371 (N.H. 1973) (“The normal standard
of care required of children … is that which it is reasonable to expect of children of like age,
intelligence, and experience under similar circumstances.”).
94 See Seidelson, supra note 92, at 20 (noting what can and cannot be considered in evaluating
is a person met the normal standard of care).
95 Id. at 17–18.
96 See similarly, Vaughn v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
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There are other ways in which tort law disadvantages litigants with emotional or mental conditions. First, at least historically, tort law did not compensate plaintiffs for “pure” emotional distress, meaning emotional distress without
accompanying physical injury. Reasons for the distinction included the difficulty
of proving inherently subjective injuries, risk of fraud, and the notion that such
harm fell outside the realm of compensable harm. The doctrine has evolved,
however, and pure emotional distress damages generally are available at least in
certain situations, including when a plaintiff observes severe physical injury
negligently inflicted on a close relative, or when a defendant intentionally and
outrageously causes emotional distress.97 Stand-alone emotional distress may
also be recovered when the plaintiff’s physical safety is threatened (the “zone of
danger” test)98 or, in some jurisdictions, when such distress is foreseeable.99
Despite these changes, tort law remains skeptical of emotional distress recovery,
as evidenced in tort reform’s focus on capping noneconomic damages, which
include pain, suffering, and other intangible harms.
Another example of mental health discrimination involves the “blackout
defense,” which is available for sudden physical, but not sudden mental,
impairments. The doctrine excuses from liability a defendant who suddenly,
without warning, suffers a seizure, heart attack, or other physical impairment
that renders him unable to exercise the degree of care otherwise expected. The
blackout cases turn on the defendants’ awareness or notice of their impairments.100 If it were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that his health
condition could impair his ability to operate a vehicle safely, for example, and
he failed to take reasonable precautions, including not driving, then he may be
liable. By contrast, in the exceptional cases allowing a sudden incapacitation
defense, the conclusion is that the defendant lacked notice of the impairment;
therefore, there was nothing he could have done to guard against it.101 Even
though the defendant’s health condition caused the injury, he is not liable.

97 See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 925 (Cal. 1968) (granting damages for IIED to a mother who
witnessed the death of her child in a negligent car accident); see also Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d
521, 528 (N.J. 1980) (granting damages for IIED to a mother who watched her son suffer and die
after he was trapped in an elevator). The tort of IIED was discussed above in the context of race
and gender discrimination.
98 See Falzone v. Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965).
99 See Gammon v. Osteopathic Hosp., 534 A.2d 1282 (Me. 1987).
100 See, e. g. Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal.App.3d 528, 532–33 (1971) (holding that liability for
drivers who cause an accident because they were suddenly stricken with illness are not liable
under the principles of absolute liability but under the principles of negligence).
101 See, e. g. Ford v. Carew & English, 200 P.2d 828, 833–34 (Cal. App. 1949) (finding evidence
on which jury could conclude that defendant did not anticipate loss of consciousness, despite
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The blackout defense, however, generally has not been extended to sudden
onset of mental impairments. In those cases, the defendants may be liable even
if they had no notice of the potential for blacking out, “wigging out,” or
otherwise losing touch with reality.102 Standard justifications for the distinction
are similar to arguments against emotional distress damages, generally, including the subjective nature of mental conditions and difficulty of proof. The
compensation goal of tort law also supports the distinction; as between two
innocent actors, the one who occasioned the loss should bear it.103 Of course,
the same compensation argument could be made for the injurer who has a
sudden heart attack that he had no way to anticipate. Moreover, the distinction
leaves difficult categorization questions, such as how to treat someone with
Alzheimer’s disease or dementia, which conditions manifest with both physical
and mental symptoms.104 Admittedly, mental impairments are highly varied,

history of dizzy spells and treatment for strained heart muscles); see also, Wood v. Jones, 516 S.
E.2d 144 (N.C. 1999) (jury question on sudden incapacitation defense, based on evidence of
either sensory overload due to Alzheimer’s disease, “mini-stroke,” or heart arrhythmia);
Storjohn v. Fay, 519 N.W.2d 521, 528 (Neb. 1994) (“The [sudden incapacitation] defense is not
available where a driver was put on notice of facts sufficient to cause an ordinary and reasonable person to anticipate that his or her driving might likely lead to injury to others.”); Bruenig
v. American Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Wis. 1970) (holding it is a jury question
whether motorist had knowledge of her paranoid schizophrenic condition and likelihood of
hallucination while driving); Eleason v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 35 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Wis.
1949) (holding defendant negligent as a matter of law for driving with known history of spells
that would render him unconscious, even though he was not aware of technical diagnosis of
epilepsy); Kollerbohm v. County of Los Angeles, 2007 WL 646244 (Cal. App. 2007) (not reported)
(finding defendant failed to carry burden of proof as a matter of law on sudden incapacitation
defense).
102 See Bashi v. Wodarz, 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 635, 637–38 (1996) (holding that sudden, unanticipated mental disorder may not be asserted as defense to negligently caused automobile
accident).
103 See Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Wis. 1970); Seidelson,
supra note 92, at 37.
104 See Edward P. Richards, Public Policy Implications of Liability Regimes for Injuries Caused
by Persons with Alzheimer’s Disease, 35 GA. L. REV. 621, 637–39 (2001) (noting difficulties with
asserting sudden incapacitation defense with diagnosis of Alzheimer’s); Vaughn E James, No
Help for the Helpless: How the Law Has Failed to Serve and Protect Persons Suffering from
Alzheimer’s Disease, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 407, 428 (2012) (noting that “traditional tort
law does not allow mental or physical impairments as defenses to liability for negligent
accident” and concluding, accordingly, that person with known Alzheimer’s Disease would
not be shielded from liability for automobile accident). But see Word v. Jones ex rel. Moore, 516
S.E.2d 144, 147–48 (N.C. 1999) (allowing affirmative defense if Alzheimer’s patient can demonstrate that the condition caused a sudden, unforeseen incapacitation, such as sensory
overload).
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and defining an appropriate adjusted standard of care risks devolving to an
impossibly subjective standard.105 We need not resolve the issue at this point,
but merely identify the potential for a subcategory of mental health discrimination in various tort doctrines.
ii Ageism
Age may operate as a proxy for health status. For example, although the ACA
generally requires community rating for health insurance plans,106 meaning that
everyone in a given community must be offered the same rates, irrespective of
individual risk profiles, the Act allows for certain exceptions. Namely, insurers
are permitted to vary premium rates based on age, tobacco use,107 and wellness
program participation.108 Each of those exceptions allow health insurers to
continue discriminating based on health status.
The same might be said of tort law’s treatment of age. First, elderly defendants do not get a special, adjusted standard of care for negligence. They are
held to the uniform, objective, reasonable person standard. Therefore, an elderly
driver who tends to drive and respond to stimuli more slowly than a younger
driver nevertheless might be held liable for causing an accident, even though
she was not actually capable of performing up to the uniform, objective standard. Unlike children whose abilities are compromised, elderly adults are not
given a “break” when it comes to tort law. The law gives children a break to
allow them the opportunity to make mistakes as they learn and integrate into
society.109 Elderly adults are already integrated and presumed to know how to
drive or perform other potentially risky adult activitie.110 To the extent that an
elderly person suffers manifest physical impairments, such as visual or hearing
impairments, the elderly person would be held to the standard of a person with
the same physical impairments, as discussed above.
Second, under traditional damages rules, an older plaintiff will almost
certainly receive a lower award than a younger person, even for the same injury.
Tort victims receive a single recovery, including both past and future damages.

105 See Seidelson, supra note 92, at 37.
106 42 USC § 300gg; 42 USC § 300gg-4(b) (2012).
107 42 USC § 300gg (allowing premium rate variation based only on whether the plan covers an
individual or family; geographic rating area; age (up to 3:1); and tobacco use (up to 1.5:1)).
108 42 USC § 300gg-4(j) (“Programs of health promotion or disease prevention”).
109 Dorais v. Paquin, 304 A.2d 369, 372 (N.H. 1973) (explaining the principle that children are
incapable of exercising judgment that requires the intelligence, knowledge and experience that
a reasonable adult would have); see also Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Minn. 1961).
110 See Roberts v. Ramsbottom, 1 All E.R. 7 (Q.B. 1979).
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Future damages, which may include pecuniary harm, such as lost earnings and
medical expenses, and nonpecuniary harm, including pain and suffering, loss of
enjoyment of life, and loss of consortium, are calculated over the plaintiff’s life
expectancy. Necessarily, older people have shorter life expectancies and, thus,
would receive lower damages. Moreover, they may not receive any or very low
lost future earnings if they are retired or near to retirement. Medical expenses
and pain and suffering will also be lower because the elderly victim would not
have to live with the injury for as long as a younger victim. As noted above, caps
on noneconomic damages exacerbate this disparity, capping these plaintiffs
noneconomic loss. Thus, to the extent age correlates with poor health, tort law
discriminates against the unhealthy in damages calculations.
iii Obesity
As discussed above, the outrage tort of IIED fails adequately to remedy racist
and sexist speech and harassment. At least part of the reason that tort fails in
those cases is because the standard of liability is whether an average member of
the community (a reasonable person), upon hearing the facts, would exclaim,
“Outrageous!”111 Accordingly, if “reasonable” jurors in a particular community
do not find racially or sexually charged speech sufficiently outrageous, there
will be no recovery. The same possibility surely exists for health conditions,
including obesity, a condition that, like race, sex, and gender, has been subject
to considerable stigma and stereotyping.
That said, at least one case suggests that the public’s attitude toward the
availability of an IIED claim based on health status, in particular, obesity, may
be more solicitous. D.J. v. Marion County Coroner’s Office112 involved a thirteenyear-old plaintiff who sued the City of Indianapolis and County Coroner’s Office
for the emotional distress he suffered in witnessing the removal of his severely
obese mother’s remains by tow truck. The plaintiff was present in the family’s
apartment when a police officer declared his mother dead and watched the
removal process from a neighbor’s house. The deputy coroner who came to
the scene was informed (wrongly) that the mortuary service did not have equipment to transport the decedent, who weighed 750 pounds. The deputy coroner
did not have the phone number of the chief coroner but instead contacted the
office secretary, who recalled a previous case in which a towing service had
been used to remove a very large decedent. Without further consultation, the

111 See Meyers v. Hot Bagels, 721 N.E.2d 1068, 1075 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (questioning if the facts
would lead an average person to exclaim “outrageous!” out of anger or resentment).
112 Johnson v. Marion Cnty. Coroner’s Office, 971 N.E.2d 151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
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deputy coroner called a towing service. The decedent’s remains were dragged
from the apartment on her mattress, under a sheet, because the coroner’s body
bags were too small. Then, in the courtyard of the apartment building, she was
hauled onto the bed of the tow truck. The towing service employees covered her
body with a dirty carpet and lashed her down to the flatbed.
The court allowed that such indelicate treatment of a person’s remains could
evidence the level of extreme and outrageous conduct necessary to sustain a
claim for IIED. The holding in D.J. suggests that tort law may recognize that
disgraceful treatment of the remains of someone suffering from obesity is
wrongful, indeed, tortious. Rather than singling out the health status of obesity
for disfavorable treatment, this case arguably treats that condition more favorably, allowing an IIED claim. The case suggests that public mores have shifted,
recognizing that obese individuals deserve to be treated with as much dignity
and respect as non-obese people and that their loved ones may foreseeably
suffer emotional distress if they are not.
Obesity is an objectively demonstrable condition. But consider the possibility for harassment that some individuals with “invisible disabilities,” including
brain cancer, cardiac conditions, or joint diseases, sometimes face when parking
in handicapped parking spaces.113 These individuals have been subjected verbal
abuse and threats, nasty notes on their windshields, or property damage such as
“keying” their cars. While such actions may be hard to litigate as IIED because
of the difficulty identifying the defendant (if the note or property damage was
done anonymously) and proving the necessary intent, those cases conceivably
also face additional hurdles on the question of outrageousness. That is, would
reasonable jurors find such conduct sufficiently extreme or unacceptable in
civilized society to support a tort claim? Or would those claims face similar
obstacles to recovery as racist and sexist speech or harassment?
In sum, tort law’s reasonably prudent person standard of care broadly
discriminates against anyone who is out of the ordinary. With respect to health
status, tort law especially disadvantages those suffering from mental and other
“invisible” illnesses or impairments, as well as the elderly. On the other hand, at

113 See David Fletcher, Parking Lot Vigilantes Abuse Woman with ‘Invisible’ Disability, SUN
SENTINEL (Jan. 2, 2015), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-disabled-tag-20150102story.html; https://www.theindychannel.com/news/local-news/woman-with-heart-conditionreturns-to-handicapped-parking-spot-to-find-insulting-note-on-car; Katie Cline, People with
Invisible Disabilities Face Discrimination While Using Parking Passes, THE RED & BLACK (Nov.
7, 2015), https://www.redandblack.com/views/people-with-invisible-disabilities-face-discrimina
tion-while-using-parking-passes/article_6a0424ba-8500-11e5-8397-e7245d3dcf2b.html.
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least one decision suggests that courts may recognize the health condition of
obesity as warranting especially favorable consideration.

3 Unhealthy plaintiffs and defendants
Next, I consider specific examples of torts decisions or doctrine in which the
litigant’s health status is central to the case. In some instances, the unhealthy
litigant is the defendant, whose health status or conduct is the harm-inflicting
medium. In other instances, the injured plaintiff suffers from a health condition
or engages in health-related conduct, which status or conduct bears on recovery
in the case. Most of the time, poor health tends to correlate with adverse
outcomes for both defendants and plaintiffs, although in a few instances the
unhealthy may fare better in torts cases.
a Unhealthy defendants
In the first category of cases, an individual’s health status itself may be the
source of injury to another person. One category of cases involves defendants
with contagious diseases who tortiously transmit the diseases to victims. In
another category of cases, defendants are impaired by substance use, thereby
causing harm to another when they perform certain acts. These cases arguably
operate as health-status discrimination inasmuch as the defendants are held
liable because of their health conditions. Someone without the contagious
disease or substance use impairment, engaged in the same act, likely would
not be held liable. Of course, without the disease or impairment, the harm might
not have resulted in the first place, thus nullifying the tort claim. Moreover, the
plaintiff may (rightly) argue that the defendants’ conduct, in light of the impairments, was unreasonable and, therefore, negligent.
i Contagious diseases
There are both torts and criminal cases in which a defendant has a known,
contagious disease to which he exposes the plaintiff. In In re Louie,114 the
bankruptcy court allowed a claim for sexual battery against the plaintiff’s
domestic partner who failed to disclose his HIV-positive status.115 The plaintiff’s
114 In re Alan Louie, 213 B.R. 754 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997).
115 Id. (The court dismissed the plaintiff’s causes of action intentional infliction of emotional
distress and fraud on the ground that he had subsequently tested HIV-negative and, therefore,
could not demonstrate a reasonable fear of infection to support those claims.)
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complaint alleged the essential elements of an unwanted, harmful or offensive
sexual touching, even though the plaintiff did not end up contracting HIV.
Similarly, in B.N. v. K.K., the Maryland Court of Appeals allowed a nurse to
bring claims for negligence, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against a doctor who knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse with her,
without divulging his diagnosis of genital herpes.116 First, the court recognized a
general tort duty on the doctor to disclose his known condition, which supported both negligence and fraud claims. Second, it found his failure to disclose
sufficiently extreme and outrageous, assuming that the nurse could demonstrate
the requisite severe emotional distress, to support an IIED claim.117
In both examples, the plaintiffs suffered from contagious health conditions
to which they knowingly exposed their sexual partners. Louie sounded in the
tort of battery, requiring an unconsented to touching. The defendant’s failure to
disclose his HIV status negated the plaintiff’s consent. B.N. found a tort law duty
to disclose one’s infectious disease status; the failure to do so supported both
negligence and fraud claims. In both cases, the plaintiffs’ health conditions
resulted in potential tort liability, thus disadvantaging them based on health
status. Another view of the cases, however, is that the defendants were treated
the same as healthy individuals, in terms of the applicable standards of liability,
only that the instruments of harm were their contagious conditions.
ii Substance use and other impairments
As discussed above in connection with the mental health subcategory, defendants who suffer from physical illnesses or conditions that impair their ability to
operate a vehicle safely may be liable in negligence, depending the defendants’
awareness or notice of their impairments. Another health status that presents a
risk of injury to others is alcohol use. Consistent with our broader definition of
health status,118 alcohol use would count as a “conduct-based health status,”
even if the individual is not actually diagnosed with alcoholism. Many of these
cases involve impaired driving.119 The issue often is not whether driving under

116 B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175 (Md. Ct. App. 1988).
117 Id. at 1176.
118 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 14–16.
119 See, e. g. Tingle v. Foster, 399 S.W.2d 475, 477–78 (Ky.1966) (holding that evidence of
defendant’s alcoholism, pattern of alcoholic indulgence, and presence of liquor bottles in her
car was admissible to show pattern of reckless or wanton driving); Fleegel v. Estate of Boyles, 61
P.3d 1267, 1269 (Alaska 2002) (finding the case for the victim after the defendant admitted he
was driving under the influence of alcohol and valium at the time of the accident, had a history
of alcohol treatment before and after the collision, and suffered anxiety disorder, panic attacks,
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the influence is negligent and caused the accident (those facts may be conceded), but whether driving under the influence is sufficiently reprehensible to
merit punitive damages. The standard for punitive damages varies by jurisdiction but several courts have found that operating a vehicle under voluntary
intoxication is “wanton,”120 “gross, willful, and wanton,”121 “wanton and reckless,”122 constitutes malice,123 or satisfies other standards supporting punitive
damages.124 Some legislatures have provided that punitive damages are recoverable against intoxicated drivers.125 Some laws express a zero tolerance policy on
drunk driving; punitive damages may be awarded without evidence that the
defendant had a history of drunk driving accidents or convictions.126 That
approach systematically disadvantages alcohol users on the basis of health
status because punitive damages are available without individualized proof of
the reprehensible nature of the plaintiffs’ conduct. Alcohol use while driving is
categorically singled out as warranting punishment, in addition to any compensatory damages already awarded. By contrast, plaintiffs engaged in other conduct potentially warranting punishment would receive individual adjudication
based on the particular facts of the case. In short, driving under the influence of
alcohol is punished by punitive damages as a rule, contrary to other impairments or conditions.
Another line of cases concerns defendant-doctors who are impaired by substance use or other conditions. Courts tend to be highly protective of physicians’
privacy regarding their health statuses. To that extent, cases involving unhealthy
physicians tend to disadvantage plaintiffs because of courts’ greater protection of
physicians’ medical privacy, compared to other types of defendants.127

depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and various gastrointestinal disorders related to
alcoholism).
120 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §52-240b (West 2015).
121 Knibbs v. Wagner, 14 A.D.2d 987, 987 (N.Y. App. Div. 1961).
122 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (West 2015).
123 CAL. CIV. CODE §3295(d) (West 2015).
124 JOHN J. KIRCHER AND CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:3
(ed. 2012).
125 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.4 (2014); Nev. Rev. Stat. §42.010 (2015); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01–
44.5 (West 2017).
126 See Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854, 859 (Cal. 1979); Franz v. Brennan, 431 N.W.2d
711, 713 (Ct. App. 1988).
127 See, e. g. Schwaller v. Maguire, 2003 WL 22976339 (Ohio 1988) (expressing particular
concern, “due to societal mores concerning abuse of drugs and [the doctor’s] role as physician,
[that] the jury might be incited to find liability due to his drug abuse rather than his breach of
the applicable duty of care”) (quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (Ohio 1983)).
But see R.K., M.D. Relator v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836, 840-41 (Tex. 1994) (allowing “offensive
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The physician’s health status may be discoverable and relevant to the tort
claim, however, if the plaintiff can establish that the condition was relevant to
the alleged injury. For example, in Baker v. Connolly,128 the plaintiff alleged
several claims, including negligent misdiagnosis and lack of informed consent,
in connection with performance of a colonoscopy. The informed consent claim
was based on allegations that the physician suffered from defects in sight,
coordination, and thought processes, and that a reasonable patient would
want to be informed of those impairments before consenting to the procedure.
The patient alleged that the physician was aware of his own condition and had
discontinued other activities, including bridge and tennis, because of his impairments. The physician did not, however, discontinue performing delicate medical
procedures, nor did he inform the patient of his impairments. The plaintiff sued
on the theory of lack of informed consent constituting a battery (an unconsented-to touching). The court held that there was at least an issue for the jury
on the battery claim.
Similarly, in R.K. v. Ramirez,129 the Texas Supreme Court allowed limited
discovery of a physician’s medical and mental health records relevant to alleged
medical malpractice in delivery of a baby who suffered from cerebral palsy,
mental retardation, and quadriplegia. Evidence of a physician’s addiction to
prescription painkillers was not admissible, however, in Schwaller v. Maguire,130
a case involving liposuction and a breast lift because the patient could not
establish that the physician was impaired while treating her, or that his use of
painkillers proximately caused any of her injuries. Schwaller demonstrates that
the mere fact of having an addiction, if not operable on the facts of the case, will
not necessarily result in liability.
Another rather unusual, non-physician fact-pattern involving an impaired
defendant is the Supreme Court of Illinois’s decision in Widlowski v. Durkee
Foods.131 Although the defendant’s health condition occasioned the plaintiff’s
injury, the court ultimately declined to hold either the defendant or his employer
liable. An employee of Durkee Foods entered an industrial tank that contained
nitrogen gas, among other substances, and inadequate oxygen for breathing.
The worker failed to take steps to clear the tank of hazardous gases or wear
protective gear. The exposure to nitrogen gas rendered him restless, incoherent,

use” of patient-litigant exception to physician-patient privilege for discovery of communications
or records relating to physician’s physical, mental, or emotional condition).
128 1988 WL 105958 (E.D. Penn. 1988).
129 887 S.W.2d 836 at 836.
130 2003 WL 22976339 (Ohio 2003).
131 562 N.E.2d 967 (Ill. 1990).
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and delirious. While still in a state of delirium and under treatment for his
condition at the hospital, the defendant bit off a part of the nurse’s finger. The
nurse sued the worker and Durkee Foods.
The court held that the defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiffnurse because the minimal likelihood of such an injury occurring and the high
burden, especially on Durkee, of guarding against potential injury by its
employee. The court concluded that “liability must stop somewhere short of
the freakish and the fantastic.” Arguably, this defendant was “unhealthy” at the
time of the incident, in the same way as other defendants acting under the
influence of drugs or alcohol.132 But the court’s rejection of the claim turned not
on the defendant’s health status; he was neither favored nor disfavored on that
basis. Rather, the case turned on the freakishly unforeseeable sequence of
events that brought about the nurse’s injury, rather than the health status of
the defendant.
On the one hand, these cases (save exceptional cases, like Durkee Foods),
disadvantage unhealthy defendants by holding them liable in tort law when
their conditions result in harm to another. One way of thinking of these cases,
however, is to say that everyone is held to the same standard of care – reasonable care under the circumstances. For people suffering from health conditions,
reasonable care includes taking their conditions into account and acting accordingly. To that extent, decisions involving unhealthy defendants do not necessarily operate systematically to disadvantage litigants based on health status. If
those defendants are able to exercise reasonable care to avoid causing injury to
others, such as by not performing medical procedures or driving a vehicle with a
known impairment, or not having sexual contact while suffering from a known
but undisclosed contagious disease, they may not be treated any differently than
a healthy defendant who otherwise fails to exercise reasonable care with respect
to other risks that he presents.

C Unhealthy victims
The next set of cases concerns unhealthy plaintiffs, or victims of personal injury.
The objective reasonably prudent standard operates on both sides of the case;

132 Id. The facts in Widlowski do not discuss whether the defendant was aware of the hazardous gases and voluntarily proceeded into the tank anyway, which facts would suggest an
assumption of the risk defense. The court did not need to reach issues of affirmative defenses
because it resolved the case on the threshold question that the defendants owed plaintiff no
duty.
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tort victims are also expected to act reasonably with respect to their own safety.
Failure to do so may result in reduced or no recovery under contributory
negligence or assumption of the risk doctrines. Courts also may consider plaintiffs’ conduct relevant to the damages calculation. There are several examples of
tort law treating unhealthy victims differently from healthy victims with respect
to these affirmative defenses and damage rules. Generally, the rules disfavor
unhealthy plaintiffs but, sometimes, unhealthy plaintiffs seem to fare better
than healthy plaintiffs.

1 Contributory negligence
Under traditional common law doctrine, courts may limit recovery for personal
injuries when the plaintiff’s own behavior is deemed to play a role in causing
the injury. Under one theory, a defendant found liable to the plaintiff for a
particular accidental injury may nevertheless assert a defense of contributory
negligence. If the defendant can establish that the plaintiff’s own fault was
also responsible for causing or worsening the injury, the defendant may avoid
paying for the whole harm. For example, an automobile accident victim may
have been driving carelessly or may have failed to wear a seatbelt. A consumer
may have ignored a safety warning on a rotary saw or used a product in a
different manner than the manufacturer intended. A cancer patient negligently
exposed to asbestos in the workplace may also have been a habitual smoker. A
plaintiff who suffered a broken leg as a result of the defendant’s wrongdoing
may subsequently fail to obtain medical treatment or participate in physical
rehabilitation, thereby exacerbating the injury. In each of these cases, courts
may disallow or reduce the plaintiff’s recovery. This recovery-limiting doctrine
may effectively incentivize individuals to wear seatbelts, quit smoking, exercise, or otherwise take better care of their health, but it also has the effect of
reducing the resources they may have to access health care or engage in
healthier habits.
Consider Ostrowski v. Azzara, a medical malpractice case involving allegedly
inappropriate removal of the plaintiff’s big toenail.133 The plaintiff’s long-standing
health conditions included insulin-dependent diabetes, hypertension, and heavy
cigarette smoking.134 She consulted the defendant, a podiatrist, about discomfort
in her feet and legs. Over a course of treatment, the defendant diagnosed the
plaintiff with vascular disease and poor circulation. He eventually recommended
133 545 A.2d 148 (N.J. 1988).
134 Id. at 149.
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removal of her entire affected big toenail. Due to the poor circulation and preexisting vascular disease, exacerbated by smoking and diabetes, the wound did
not heal properly. The plaintiff required multiple bypass surgeries to save the toe
and prevent gangrene and amputation of the leg.135
At trial, defense counsel was permitted to present evidence of the plaintiff’s
poor self-care, in terms of smoking, weight management, and blood sugar
control both before her consultation with the defendant and after the toenail
removal and subsequent bypass operations.136 The evidence established that her
pre-injury conduct may have been as much as fifty percent responsible for the
vascular disease.137 The jury also was permitted to consider the plaintiff’s postinjury conduct as evidence of comparative negligence.138 Accordingly, the jury
found the defendant forty-nine percent at fault for removing her toenail without
adequate consideration of her vascular condition and the plaintiff fifty-one
percent at fault for her conduct.139 Because the plaintiff’s fault exceeded the
defendant’s, she was denied any recovery.140
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court was careful to separate the
multiple issues presented. With respect to the pre-injury conduct, the court
first noted the eggshell plaintiff doctrine, which provides that the defendant
“takes his victim as he finds him.”141 That rule bars the jury’s consideration of
the plaintiff’s pre-treatment health habits as evidence of fault. Physicians have a
duty to treat their patients’ health conditions, regardless how they were
acquired. Moreover, as a matter of damages, the eggshell plaintiff rule allows
the plaintiff to recover whatever injury results from the defendant’s conduct,
even if it is more extensive than a healthier or less fragile plaintiff would have
experienced.142 Tort law’s general damages rule calls for the plaintiff to receive
an award of money that would make her “whole,” i. e. put her back in the
position she would have occupied but-for the defendant’s tort. A medically
fragile plaintiff may be injured more severely than a more robust plaintiff by
the same activity or conduct. Accordingly, the eggshell plaintiff rule arguably

135 Id. at 149–51.
136 Id. at 157–58.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 151.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 149.
142 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 593 (9th ed. 2009) (stating “[t]he principle that a defendant is
liable for a plaintiff’s unforeseeable and uncommon reactions to the defendant’s negligent or
intentional act”). Alternatively, courts and scholars call this the “eggshell-skull rule,” the “thinskull rule,” or the “special-sensitivity rule.” Id.
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favors the unhealthy by allowing plaintiffs with preexisting health conditions to
recover a higher amount of damages than someone without the preexisting
condition.143
Even under the eggshell plaintiff rule, the defendant is liable only for the
harm that he, in fact, caused. In other words, the defendant is liable for
exacerbating the underlying condition, but not the condition itself. In
Ostrowski, it was clear that the defendant doctor did not cause the plaintiffs’
preexisting conditions. Nevertheless, the court held that evidence of the plaintiff’s underlying vascular disease was relevant to the jury’s determination
whether the defendant recommended an appropriate course of treatment.144
The plaintiff’s post-injury conduct could be considered for two purposes: First,
as a matter of contributory negligence, the jury could consider whether her posttreatment conduct caused the injury for which she was seeking compensation,
namely, the contraindicated toe surgery and resulting bypass surgeries. Second,
post-injury conduct was relevant to the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which
disallows recovery for items of damages, occurring after the defendant’s actionable
wrong, which reasonably could have been avoided through plaintiff’s reasonable
conduct.145 In other words, the plaintiff has a duty to mitigate his damages after
they are inflicted. The trial court’s faulty jury charge on both points permitted the
jury to completely bar, rather than merely reduce, plaintiff’s recovery.
Following the rules established in Ostrowski, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held in Tobia v. Cooper Hospital146 that health care professionals could assert a
patient’s self-neglect to limit damages but not as a contributory negligence
defense. Tobia involved an elderly patient who fell from a gurney while waiting
in the emergency room. The patient, after initially declining assistance to use the
restroom, changed her mind and tried to get down on her own. In so doing, she
fell and injured her knee.147 The majority opinion was quite insistent that a
contributory negligence defense was not available because the defendant-medical
providers had a duty to abide applicable medical and hospital policies regarding
143 See, e. g. Vidrine v. Sentry Indem. Co., 341 So. 2d 558, 563 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Shia v.
Chvasta, 377 S.E.2d 664, 648 (W. Va. 1988).
144 Ostrowski, 545 A.2d at 157–58.
145 The avoidable consequences doctrine does not require plaintiffs to take every possible
precaution or treatment for the condition but only those that are reasonable medical recommendations. Medical expenses minimize harm. For instance, if a victim’s leg is broken due to
another’s negligence, the victim should, at the very least, have the bone set, allowing her to use
the leg again within a few months, rather than suffering through life without the use of the leg.
Expenses must be reasonable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt d. (1977).
146 643 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1994).
147 Id. at 2-3.
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care of an incompetent patient.148 That said, the defendants on remand could
assert the patient's self-neglect to limit damages: “Thus, if Mrs. Tobia had, while
lying on the floor, deliberately violated the hospital professionals' instructions not
to move, thereby aggravating her condition, a trier of fact could find that she had
not mitigated her damages as she should have.”149
In both examples, unhealthy or physically frail plaintiffs experienced disadvantage with respect to their ability, potentially, to recover full compensation
for medical professionals’ negligence. Had a non-frail person, who had no
reason to question her ability to get down from a gurney, slipped and fallen,
her health status would not have been part of the damages equation. The
principle suggested in the New Jersey cases, however, is that unhealthy individuals are expected to take care of their own conditions, on pain on reduced
recovery if they fail to do so. Contrast the adjusted, lower standard of care for
persons with recognized physical disabilities or conditions. As noted above, a
person who is blind or has another physical disability is held not to the uniform,
objective standard of care, but to a lower, more generous, standard, taking into
account her disability. In the two medical cases just described, however, the
plaintiffs’ duty of care seems to be adjusted upward; unhealthy victims must
take particular care of themselves and their frailties, on pain of potentially being
denied complete recovery if they do not.

2 Assumption of the risk
Another line of cases that potentially discriminate based on health status
involve victims whose engage in health-risky conduct. These cases may fall
under the doctrine of assumption of the risk or contributory negligence, depending on the particular conduct in question and the jurisdiction’s approach.
Assumption of the risk, when applicable, bars recovery by a plaintiff who
voluntarily encounters a known risk presented by the defendant’s conduct.
The form of the doctrine that bars recovery turns on the plaintiff’s express or
implied, voluntary, pre-injury agreement to relieve the defendant of liability.
Essentially, these are waivers or exculpatory clauses, in the express sense, or
assumption of the inherent risks of the activity, in the implied sense. Express
waivers may be in writing, for example, as a condition of participating in certain
sports activities, or implied just as a matter of joining in the activities, such as
spectating at a sporting event or playing a pick-up game of football. These forms
148 Id. at 4.
149 Id.
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of assumption of the risk are distinguished from situations in which the plaintiff’s willingness to encounter the defendant’s negligence is treated merely as a
variant of contributory negligence, for which recovery may be reduced but not
necessarily barred.
As discussed more fully in the book, our operational definition of healthism
includes not only static conditions but also conduct or habits that bear on
health. That view is consistent with other antidiscrimination laws and scholarship that extend legal protections to mutable, or arguably mutable, conditions
including military service history, religion, pregnancy, and gender-identity.
Likewise, we include examples of lifestyle discrimination in the workplace
based on tobacco use and obesity, which habits and conditions, although
impacted by the addictive nature of the substances or other physiological
factors, also involve a degree of voluntary behavior. Consistent with that
approach, we necessarily consider conduct-related health status cases here, too.
Plaintiffs have been deemed to assume the risk in tort cases involving a wide
range of voluntary and recreational activities, such as skydiving, skiing, ski-dooing,
horseback riding, car racing, gym membership, and competitive triathlons and
running races. By requiring the plaintiff – the person choosing to engage in the
risky activity – to bear the loss of any resulting injury, the doctrine encourages him
to think carefully about the costs and benefits of the activity versus the potential for
personal injury.150 Rational actors may decide that the risk is not worth taking,
thereby avoiding injury and the resultant cost of medical care.
In many cases, it is easy to discern health-related behaviors that are within
the plaintiff’s control and, therefore, arguably appropriate grounds for differential treatment under the law. One can readily refrain from bungee jumping or
downhill skiing. Other cases, however, present more difficult questions. For
example, consider facts similar to Ostrowski above: Should an obese patient
whose broken leg fails to heal as quickly as a non-obese patient be denied full
recovery for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and time away from work on
the grounds that he could have lost the weight? Should he at least be required to
demonstrate an attempt, even if failed, to mitigate the further injury caused by
his weight. Would evidence of the patient’s genetic predisposition to obesity or
social, economic, or cultural barriers to weight loss be relevant in rebutting the
asserted defense?
Assumption of the risk is also less than straightforward, sometimes operating to encourage personal responsibility but other times recognizing that not all
150 See Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1190 (Pa. 1990) (denying
recovery to an experienced skier injured boarding a ski lift because she was deemed to have
assumed the risks of the activity).
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risks are freely assumed. For example, consumers of fast food attempted a
litigation against the fast food industry for selling dangerous, addictive products
styled on the highly successful tobacco litigation.151 One of the arguments
against allowing fast-food consumers to recover against McDonald’s was that
the consumers knew the health risks and continued to eat the food anyway.152
The plaintiffs claimed that McDonald’s food was addictive, just like tobacco;
therefore, they did not freely and voluntarily assume the risk. But courts generally rejected the fast food cases. Subsequently, a number of states, with strong
support from the National Restaurant Association, have passed statutes prohibiting similar fast food suits.153
Other cases, however, present more difficult questions regarding whether
the plaintiff’s decision to encounter the risks of the defendant’s hazardous
conduct was truly knowing and voluntary. Does a worker who chooses to
continue in an unsafe work environment, rather than quitting the job, voluntarily assume the risk of injury? Do the lack of other employment opportunities,
given the economic climate or the particular workers’ skills or abilities to obtain
other employment, bear on the voluntariness? In other contexts, such as emergency medical treatment, courts have declined to enforce otherwise contractually valid exculpatory agreements on public policy grounds, essentially
declaring that some risks are too great or too unfair to allow plaintiffs to
encounter. Moreover, we might add, they offend health welfarism by denying
access to essential medical care and are not consistent with health liberty
because individuals pressed to the choice of foregoing medical treatment versus
tort recovery are not making truly voluntary choices. The employment example
raises further questions under health justice, if there are structural barriers, as
suggested, to freely leaving the job.

3 Wrongful birth
Another, discrete set of cases involving unhealthy victims concern a particular
type of medical malpractice – sterilization through tubal ligation or vasectomy.
151 Michelle M. Mello et al., The McLawsuit: The Fast-Food Industry and Legal Accountability for
Obesity, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Nov. 1, 2003), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.
22.6.207.
152 Id.
153 See Noel Diem, Obesity Lawsuits: Who’s to Blame When Fast Food Makes You Fat?, LAW
STREET (June 6, 2015), https://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/law-and-politics/weighing-obesitylawsuits/ (noting that 26 states have banned suits against fast food manufacturers and
restaurants).
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If a physician negligently performs the procedure, the patient or his partner may
experience unplanned pregnancy.154 The difficult issue in the cases is not
determining whether the physician breached the professional standard of care,
or whether such breach caused the resulting pregnancy. Rather, courts struggle
with the question of damages. It is mostly noncontroversial that the plaintiff
may recover past and future medical expenses, pain and suffering, and lost
wages associated with the ineffective medical procedure, and the repeat surgery
to complete the sterilization. A number of courts also allow noneconomic loss in
terms of the pain and suffering of the unplanned pregnancy and the spouse’s
loss of consortium. Others include the medical costs of the prenatal care,
delivery, and postnatal care.
The harder question, however, is whether any damages should be awarded
for the financial costs of rearing the unplanned child. The approaches are
varied. Some courts allow recovery for the rearing costs, but offset them against
the benefits, tangible and intangible, that the parents derive from the birth of a
healthy child. That approach derives from a line of cases presuming that a child
is a “blessing” and, thus, can not be considered “harm” for torts purposes. Other
courts allow full recovery with no offset for the value that the parents gain. That
more approach comports with the make-whole compensation goal of tort law,
recognizing that but-for the defendant’s tort, the plaintiff would not have suffered these expenses, no matter how delightful or successful the child turns out
to be.
A further issue – and the one implicating healthism – arises with some
courts’ differential accounting of damages if the unplanned pregnancy results
in an unhealthy child. If parents bear a healthy child, courts may decline to
award full rearing costs based on the presumed joy notion. They might further
suggest that the parents’ decision to forgo abortion or adoption as a way to
“mitigate” their damages is further evidence that the parents consider the
benefits of having the child to outweigh the costs. On the other hand, if a
child is born unhealthy or disabled, then courts may award the full costs of
rearing the child. The presumed joy rationale, apparently, no longer applying.
The overall effect of the approach is to deem a disabled child a tort damage
and a healthy child a net benefit to its parents. That seems healthist in the
starkest terms. The approach actually favors the unhealthy child by allowing

154 See, e. g. Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 466–67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that a
healthy child could be a bane rather than a blessing and was a cognizable injury of medical
malpractice, when a married couple, already the parents of nine children, brought a case
against the physician who had negligently performed a sterilization operation on the wife,
leading to in their subsequent tenth pregnancy and child).
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greater recovery; however, the expressive function of the tort award suggests
that disabled child is a liability while healthy child is a blessing. The differential treatment of damages in wrongful birth cases is also arguably healthist
toward the mother, who receives a reduced recovery (or no recovery, if the
claim is not cognizable) for medical injury to her reproductive autonomy,
compared to other medical error victims who would receive make-whole
compensation.

D Healthism in tort law
This final Part considers in detail an example of tort law’s differential treatment
of the unhealthy through our decisional rubric included above.155 Some of the
instances of health-status discrimination in tort law that we flagged may be
deemed healthist when examined more carefully under our rubric, while others
may be considered benign or even desirable. The goal here, as with the project
more broadly, is not necessarily to convince the reader that our conclusion is the
right one. The rubric is intentionally a flexible list of considerations, not a hardand-fast rule of elements that must be met. We invite readers to argue against
us, much as we invite our students to make a case for the other side after
reading the court’s holding in a given case. Ultimately, our book is intended
to bring attention to various examples of differential treatment based on health
and start a conversation about the merits and demerits of the particular law,
policy, or practice through the healthism lense. Our rubric suggests key considerations that we find compelling in making those judgments, but we welcome
and respect other ideas and suggestions.

1 Healthist health status classification
The torts example unpacked below is one that the book uses as a relatively
clear case of benign health status classification. Generally, although there are
many instances of differential treatment based on health status in both torts
and contract law, it is much harder to deem those examples clearly healthist,
given the various competing policies at play. Thus, to get a flavor of the
rubric’s operation, it may be helpful first to consider a clear-cut example
from another context. Our book discusses nicotine hiring bans156 and
155 See supra Table 1.
156 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 183–88.
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discriminatory pricing in health insurance, especially based on HIV/AIDS
status,157 as clear-cut examples of healthism. Taking the first of those, the
rubric plays out as follows: Refusing to hire based on out-of-work conduct
offends health welfarism by excluding workers who otherwise may be most
qualified for the job and perhaps driving those workers to suboptimal employment. Moreover, denying access to employment also typically denies access to
employer-sponsored health insurance and, thus, limits access to health care,
which could help the individual address any addiction and treat any associated health conditions. Lack of treatment will tend to exacerbate the conditions, making them more costly to treat down the line.
Health liberty also is offended because the conduct is extracurricular; this is
a different from a policy from banning smoking at the workplace or limiting it to
certain locations and break times. The policy thus intrudes on privacy and
autonomy. Given the widespread stigma, animus, and stereotypes against nicotine users, especially smokers, the policy also offends health equality. Consider
a host of other out-of-work conduct – sunbathing, contentious marriages, promiscuity, insomnia, ultra-running – that can also have deleterious health effects
but which typically are not the object of hiring bans. Thus, there is a strong
inference that smoking bans operate more from animus than rational costbenefit analysis.
Nicotine hiring bans also offend health justice. As already discussed, the
policies impede access to health care, leading to potentially worse health
outcomes. Moreover, those results exacerbate existing disparities, supported
by data showing that racial minorities, people with disabilities, and lowincome individuals are more likely to use nicotine.158 Those groups already
suffer health disparities and other inequities. Even if nicotine hiring bans
create one more incentive to quit, the empirical evidence about their effectiveness is far from clear, and there are other approaches, including an
employer offering smoking cessation classes, that are more consistent with
our guiding principles.

2 Benign health status classification
Turning now to a torts example, consider the case of the impaired physician.
Holding that individual liable for injury caused to a patient, we conclude, is not
157 Id. at 188–92 (discussing, in particular, a Florida lawsuit regarding insurers’ charging
higher copayments and coinsurance to treat HIV/AIDS than for other conditions).
158 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 187, n. 15.
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healthist even though the judgment surely is to the detriment of that unhealthy
individual. First, with respect to health welfare, which derives from classical
utilitarianism, there is strong support for utilitarian analysis of tort law.159 Judge
Learned Hand’s formula provides that an actor is negligent when the cost of
additional precautions is less than the cost of the accident to be avoided.160 On
the flipside, if the additional precaution is not cost-justified, then the actor will
not be negligent for failing to take it. Essentially, the formula turns on the the
net welfare effect of holding the defendant liable. The impaired physician case
might be brought as negligence action, either for breach of the applicable
medical standard of care or breach of informed consent for failing to disclose
the substance abuse problem to the patient. Thus, in our example, it could be
that holding the doctor liable would not improve societal welfare. If the costs of
informing the patient are too high (due to, for example, loss of physician
privacy, or potential “warning pollution” of too much information, which
patients then ignore), or the probability of the physician’s health condition
presenting a risk (perhaps the physician is in recovery and highly compliant
with the program, or, as in some of the discussed cases, the physician is not
actually impaired at the time of the medical procedure), then holding the
physician liabile would tend to waste overall societal resources.
But consider instead health – as opposed to economic – welfare. A tort
verdict could improve health welfare if it operates as a deterrent or incentive for
the substance-addicted physician to clean up his act. That could then improve
his own individual health status, if he is able to get medical help to address his
problem. Although deterrence and creating incentives for safety are common
justifications for the torts system, there is also good reason to question whether
people really act rationally in the face of actual or potential torts judgments.161
159 See, e. g. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD.
103, 119 (Jan. 1979) (arguing for the economic norm of “wealth maximization” to replace
utilitarianism in tort law); see also Mark A. Geistfeld, Efficiency, Fairness, and Economic
Analysis of Tort Law, N.Y. UNIV. L. & ECON. WORKING PAPERS, Paper 184, at 6 (Apr. 2009),
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1189&context=nyu_lewp (claiming that economic analysis can be fully compatible with welfare economics and, therefore, integral to
rights-based tort systems).
160 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“Liability depends
upon whether [the burden of adequate precautions] is less than [the gravity of the resulting
injury] multiplied by [the probability of that injury occurring].”); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737,
740 (2d Cir. 1932) (using industry customs of precaution and ideas of common prudence to
determine if the defendant was properly diligent).
161 See, e. g. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1497 (1998) (arguing that, according to Coasian principles, parties will bargain for a
different outcome in the face of a court judgment, if there is a preferable outcome); but see also
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That said, a judgment against the physician also improves collective health by
bringing an unsafe provider to light and perhaps reducing or eliminating his
ability to harm others, if his license or privileges to practice medicine were
reduced or revoked as a result. Private law notoriously acts as a backup and
reinforcement for more formal regulation of safety.162
Health liberty also points to the liability verdict against the substanceabusing physician being non-healthist. A libertarian view of tort law values
freedom of action. Part of that means holding actors liable for the results of
their actions when they choose to expose others to risk, either intentionally or by
failing to act reasonably. A libertarian likely would support a liability verdict
against the unhealthy physician as long as the physician were aware of the risk
that he was taking in operating under the influence. Even if we accept a degree
of involuntariness with use or abuse of addictive substances, the physician still
knew of his impairment and proceeded anyway. It becomes a harder question,
however, if the substances impaired his ability to make a rational choice
whether to operate or not. Because tort law generally does not recognize mental
impairments as warranting an adjustment from the generally applicable reasonably prudent person standard of care, the physician might be liable even under
those circumstances. Setting aside that wrinkle, nothing about a tort verdict
would seem to limit the physician’s ability to access health care, or make
decisions about his own health or wellness. It is possible that the size of the
judgment and/or resulting loss of license or employment could impair his ability
to pay for health care, namely, through employer-sponsored insurance. But
balanced against the other criteria, that attenuated possibility does not warrant
deeming this example healthist.
With respect to health equality, we might take a step back and reconsider
whether this example constitutes differential treatment at all – in even the anticlassification, much less anti-subordination, sense. If not, then health equality is
not implicated. Although the physician may be held liable for operating under
the influence, it may not be that he was treated differently from similarly
situated defendants based on his health status. To be sure, his health status is
Michael G. Faure, Calabresi and Behavioural Tort Law and Economics, 1 ERASMUS L. REV 75, 76
(2008) (arguing that decision-making involves cognitive biases that doe not always end in
actions predicted by traditional economic models).
162 See Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality: The Respective Roles
of Regulation and Tort Law, 42 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 163, 163–64 (1998). (stating that the
application of the juncture between law and economics has only accentuated the deterrent
role that tort law plays); see also THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE v-vi (5th ed. 1898) (arguing that private actions for negligence and the
damages recovered in those actions are powerful deterrents).

122

E. Weeks

what resulted in the patient’s injury (although there could be an argument,
depending on the facts, that even a sober doctor would have caused the same
harm). Rather, he is held liable for failing to uphold the applicable standard of
care for informed consent or performance of medical treatment, the same
standard applied to all physicians, healthy or unhealthy. His failure to take
reasonable precautions in the face of his substance problem or other impairment
is what made him liable, not the mere fact that he was using unhealthy. A
physician who performed a delicate operation despite knowing his relative
inexperience with the procedure, similarly would take a calculated (and perhaps
unreasonable) risk. That otherwise healthy physician would be treated the same
as our similarly situated drug-abusing physician.
Health justice hardly seems implicated. There is no apparent long-standing,
entrenched bias against, subordination of, or structural obstacle to achieving
welfare, liberty, or equality when it comes to substance-abusing physicians. If
anything, physicians occupy a rather elite, professional class in society, generally. Moreover, as noted above, courts tend to be especially deferential to their
privacy, disallowing discovery and admission of evidence regarding substance
use or other impairments unless it seems clearly and directly to bear on the
allegations in the case. In sum, holding unhealthy defendants liable in torts
when their health status is the medium of injury may not even be health-status
classification, but, even if so, the decision does not seem to be healthist.

3 Possibly healthist health status classification
For an equivocal case, consider a corollary example of an unhealthy torts
plaintiff, rather than an unhealthy defendant. A plaintiff’s health status may
arise when she engages in health-risky activity as an affirmative defense to
negligence. The defendant may argue that even if he acted unreasonably in
exposing the plaintiff to risk, the plaintiff was either contributorily negligent or
assumed the risk by engaging in the activity in the first place. For ease of
analysis, we will use an example of express assumption of the risk: A plaintiff
signs a release of liability upon entrance to a ski resort. While skiing, she is
injured on a manmade condition on the ski slopes and sues the resort. As a
defense to the alleged negligence in construction or maintenance of the slopes,
the resort points to the signed release, in which the plaintiff (allegedly) agreed
not to sue the resort.
So which view is potentially discriminatory based on health status? The
one that paternalistically protects individuals who engage in health-risky
activities from their own decisions to sign away their tort remedies, or the
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one that holds individuals to their bargains, disallowing tort recovery even for
serious injuries? Treating individuals who choose risky activities paternalistically may be discriminatory but may not be normatively wrong under our
rubric. On the other hand, disallowing tort recovery could operate as an
incentive for people to avoid such activities, thereby improving their individual
health, and, consequently, collective health. Avoiding risky activities could
lower accident rates, thereby also lowering health care costs. Allowing people
to recover fully, despite knowingly and voluntarily engaging in dangerous
activities, presents a moral hazard problem. But that view assumes that individuals have a choice about whether or not to undertake the activity. It may be
fair to conclude that no one is conscripted to go skiing, but what if the facility
in question is a health club, and a waiver of liability is required as a condition
of membership? Suppose further that the plaintiff’s physician has recommended an exercise regime?
Which view is most consistent with health liberty? The answer depends. On
the one hand, holding individuals, including unhealthy individuals and individuals engaged in health-risky activities, to their contracts respects their liberty
and autonomy. They are free to sign enforceable agreements. Upholding those
contracts may give the individual plaintiffs, and society as a whole, more
choices of health care providers and recreational facilities because those individuals and entities could shield themselves from potentially exorbitant torts
judgments. If they are able to operate free from that financial threat, they can
keep their costs and prices down for all customers. Moreover, if there is sufficient market demand for the same services, without the waiver of liability, then
competing facilities will offer the same services, plus full rights to sue in the
event of negligence or injuries. In other words, a “Motel 6” ski resort could have
an enforceable waiver of liability and cheaper lift tickets, while a “Ritz Carlton”
ski resort could not require guests to sign a waiver but would charge more for lift
tickets. Having alternatives enhances individuals’ and the public’s freedom of
choice. To that extent, waivers of liability across contexts, medical or not, could
promote access to health care. That argument underlies much of tort reform: If
health care providers did not face unlimited, staggering liability, health care
costs would decrease and providers would be more widely available, not
deterred out of the business by malpractice fears. Empirical evidence on that
question, however, points in both directions.163
163 See Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, HEALTH AFF
(MILLWOOD) (Sept. 2010), at 8, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3048809/pdf/nihms269333.pdf; Myungho Paik et al., Will Tort Reform Bend the Cost
Curve? Evidence from Texas, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (June 2012) at 174; J. William Thomas
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On the other hand, expecting a patient undergoing medical treatment to sign
away her right to a medical malpractice action hardly seems voluntary or consistent with freedom of action, especially if she very much needs the treatment
and has no alternate location or provider from which to receive it. As torts cases
recognize, if the patients’ consent truly does not seem voluntary, for example, if
she signs moments before being wheeled to the operating room, the contract may
not be enforced. Depending on the circumstances, medical waivers could also
implicate health justice, if poorer patients are relegated to the “Motel 6” facilities
that require signing a waiver while healthier patients have the financial luxury to
choose a “Ritz Carlton” facility that preserves their right to sue. That dichotomy
while possibly allowing access to lower-cost medical care, exacerbates existing
disparities by creating a two- (or multi-) tiered medical system, with the poor
exposed to uncompensated malpractice and the weathy retaining the right to sue.
Moreover, if health care providers were sheltered from tort liability through
waivers, they might not be incentivized to perform to the same standard of
quality. That argument may be easily rebutted, however. Health care and other
professionals are governed not just by personal injury law but also by state
licensing boards, professional codes of conduct, the Hippocratic Oath (in the
case of doctors), moral and other reasons to treat patients with their full competence. Thus, it is dubious to say that enforcing waivers of liability in the medical
context would produce worse health outcomes to any meaningful degree. The
same may not be true, however, of recreational facilities. Protecting our ski resort
operator from liability through enforceable waivers may disincentivize him from
maintaining the slopes and other facilities in safe working order, which could lead
to more accidents, worse health outcomes, and increased health care costs.
For reasons discussed in more depth in the book,164 the mutable versus
immutable (or voluntary versus involuntary) distinction suggested elsewhere is
not particularly illuminating. Thus, our definition of “unhealthy” includes both
static health conditions and health-related conduct. Nevertheless, case law
appropriately distinguishes among types of voluntary activities when it comes
to enforcement of waivers of liability. Likewise, we probably would not consider
enforcement of a waiver of liability in the recreational context healthist, but we
might give more pause to enforcement of a similar waiver in the health care

et al., Low Costs of Defensive Medicine, Small Savings from Tort Reform, HEALTH AFFAIRS: MED.
MALPRACTICE & ERRORS (Sept. 2010) at 1578–79, available at https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/
abs/10.1377/hlthaff.2010.0146; Michael B. Rotherberg et al., The Cost of Defensive Medicine on 3
Hospital Medicine Services, JAMA INTERNAL MEDICINE: RESEARCH LETTER (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/1904758.
164 See ROBERTS & WEEKS, supra note 1, at 15–16.
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context. Alternatively, we could carve out the health care-setting waivers by
stipulating that agreeing to a medical procedure is not “unhealthy” conduct in
the same way that agreeing to skiing, snow-tubing, sky-diving, racecar-driving,
or bungee jumping is. Thus, the medical waiver cases could be deemed not to
concern unhealthy plaintiffs at all.
In sum, our criteria point in both directions on whether denying plaintiffs
full tort recovery for engaging in health-risky activity is healthist. Sticking to the
examples of recreational activities, our criteria suggest that the assumption of
the risk defense in those cases promotes healthy decisionmaking, facilitates
individual choice about health care and health risks, and increases the availability of recreational facilities. Whether recreational activity waivers lower
health risks and health care costs, however, is less clear. If participants are
incentivized to take more precautions or deliberation regarding those activities
because they will not be allowed to sue if injured, then the waivers may lower
health risks. But if operators are incentivized to take fewer precautions or
maintenance of their facilities, there may be more accidents.
Although plaintiffs in the recreational activity cases are, in some sense,
“punished” for their private conduct by being unable to recover fully, the assumption of the risk doctrine does not seem driven by animus or likely to stigmatize
risk-preferring individuals. Being denied tort recovery could cut off resources to
pay for medical treatment for the injuries (to the extent the victim did not
otherwise have health insurance), which could result in worse health outcomes
if they are not adequately treated. But the rule does not cut off resources or limit
the individuals’ ability to adopt healthier (i. e. safer) lifestyles or exacerbate
underlying health disparities. Therefore, on balance, courts’ enforcing recreational
waivers of liability does not seem healthist. As noted above, we would be more
concerned about the potential for healthism with waivers in the medical context,
but may not regard those as health-status classifications in the first place.

III Conclusion
This article offers a brief overview of the concept of healthism – a new protected
category for the unhealthy – and its particular application in the context of tort
law. The main work of the private law chapter of our book is to highlight a
number of underexamined examples of differential treatment based on health
status in torts and contracts, but not necessarily to conclude that all, or perhaps,
any of the examples are healthist. Indeed, the torts and contracts examples may
be especially difficult to label as normatively wrong, given the range of
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competing public policies and private interests underlying them. To be sure, tort
law treats both unhealthy defendants and unhealthy victims differently in many
cases, but that is not necessarily a bad, or healthist, thing. There is certainly
potential for healthism in pockets of tort law, including subcategories of mental
health and medical injury, which warrant awareness, if not affirmative reform at
the present time. Tort law already has evolved in a positive direction away from
discriminating on those bases, consistent with our thesis. Nevertheless, readers
are encouraged to continue critically examining tort laws, decisions, statutes,
and policies for additional instances of unfair or otherwise normatively wrong
treatment of the unhealthy.
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